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The paper concentrates on illustrating and assessing central banks’ liquidity 
operations during the crisis that started in August 2007. In addition to the ECB, 
the central banks of Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, 
Canada and the United States are analyzed. During the crisis the liquidity 
operations of central banks have converged. In many cases, central bank balance 
sheets have undergone extremely strong growth. The actions by central banks 
raise a number of questions concerning exit from the measures taken, the impact 
of the measures, central banks’ risks and their governance structure. 
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Keskuspankkien likviditeettioperaatiot 
rahoitusmarkkina- ja talouskriisin aikana: 
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Pentti Pikkarainen 




Tässä keskustelualoitteessa kuvataan ja arvioidaan keskuspankkien likviditeetti-
operaatioita elokuussa 2007 alkaneen kriisin aikana. Euroopan keskuspankin 
lisäksi kuvauksen ja arvioinnin kohteena ovat Australian, Ison-Britannian, Japa-
nin, Kanadan, Ruotsin, Sveitsin ja Yhdysvaltojen keskuspankit. Keskuspankkien 
toimissa kriisin aikana ei ole korostunut niinkään erilaisuus tai heterogeenisuus, 
vaan pikemminkin keskuspankkien likviditeettioperaatiot ovat samankaltaistuneet. 
Keskuspankkien taseet ovat kasvaneet monessa tapauksessa erittäin voimakkaasti. 
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During the ongoing financial and economic crisis that began in August 2007, a 
number of strong, and in many cases unprecedented, non-standard measures have 
been taken in the various segments of economic policy. With regard to monetary 
policy, central banks have sharply cut their policy rates, and interest rates are 
currently at a record low level. As well as interest rate policy, central banks have 
also implemented a range of measures to provide additional liquidity both in their 
domestic markets (economic areas) and with respect to other economic areas. 
  The macroeconomic situation is forecast to improve gradually, at least when 
viewed in terms of the pace of output growth. In many countries, however, 
unemployment is very high. Financial markets remain vulnerable, particularly due 
to concerns over the funding and sustainability of public finances. Even so, 
governments and central banks in many countries are phasing out the policies 
pursued during the crisis. The central banks that have been the first to do so have 
already increased their policy rates or otherwise tightened their monetary policy 
stance. A stepwise unwinding of non-standard measures in liquidity management 
is under way. On the other hand, some central banks have actually continued to 
expand certain non-standard measures. 
  The present paper concentrates on illustrating and assessing central banks’ 
liquidity operations during the crisis. In addition to the European Central Bank 
(ECB) / Eurosystem, also presented and analysed are the central banks of 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United States. As the crisis starts to bottom out little by little, it will be possible to 
gradually proceed to describe and evaluate the measures taken. At the present 
juncture, however, the analysis is inevitably of a highly tentative nature. Thorough 
research on the actions of central banks and other policymakers and their 
implications during the crisis is sparse. The time for such research will come later. 
  This paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 recaps the fundamentals of 
monetary policy, especially from the perspective of liquidity management. 
Chapter 3 looks into central bank measures in the area of liquidity management in 
the eight countries mentioned above. In addition to the liquidity operations, the 
development of central bank balance sheets is also reviewed. Chapter 4 singles 
out questions raised by the measures taken and the consequently strongly 
expanded balance sheets . At this stage, only indicative answers or tentative 
reflections can be offered for many of these questions. Chapter 5 briefly 




2  Central bank liquidity management: a recap of 
fundamentals 
Through their activities, central banks seek to influence one or other 
macroeconomic variable, generally either inflation or output (economic growth) 
or a combination of the two. In striving towards this final target, the central bank 
will normally seek to influence a short-term money market interest rate so that it 
is configured in a way consistent with the desired development of the final target.
1 
In many cases, the overnight rate is the money market rate that central banks are 
most keen to steer. This interest rate is described as the operational target of 
monetary policy. Of the central banks reviewed in this paper, the overnight rate is 
the operational target of all apart from the ECB and the Swiss National Bank. The 
ECB has not given a clear definition of its operational target, although in some of 
its statements it has implied that it is the overnight rate. The Swiss National 
Bank’s operational target is the three-month unsecured money market rate. 
  Central banks seek to influence their operational targets via either open 
market operations or standing facilities or a combination of the two. In 
conducting open market operations, they actively regulate the amount of central 
bank liquidity in the banking system so that the operational target is as close as 
possible to the target adopted.
2 The key policy rate of open market operations is 
generally close to the level of the operational target. 
  In the daily recourse to standing facilities, the initiative lies with the banks, 
not with the central bank, as in the case of open market operations. Standing 
facilities may include two elements: the marginal lending facility and the deposit 
facility. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility is higher than the key 
policy rate, and therefore central bank funding provided through this channel is 
somewhat more expensive for banks than funding obtained via the main open 
market operation. The interest rate on the deposit facility, in turn, is lower than 
that on the main open market operation, and banks are therefore not encouraged to 
use the deposit facility, but to invest their excess reserves in the market. 
  Many central banks have a minimum reserve system in place. Of the central 
banks covered by this study, Australia, Canada and Sweden do not operate a 
minimum reserve system. Previously, such a system was seen as an instrument for 
influencing the supply of bank credit. This is not the case at present. This is 
primarily due to the fact that reserve holdings are remunerated at a rate of interest 
                                                 
1 Bindseil (2004) provides a thorough presentation of the operational implementation of monetary 
policy. It also provides an accurate analysis of various monetary policy instruments. Mitlid and 
Vesterlund (2001) give a good brief account of the operational framework for monetary policy. 
2 At the time when open market operations were introduced, they were as a rule conducted as 
outright asset purchases and sales, but currently they normally take the form of either repos 
(repurchase agreements on securities) or collateralised credit (Bindseil 2004).  
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equal to the market interest rate or the central bank policy rate. Minimum reserve 
systems normally include averaging provisions. This means that banks may fulfil 
their reserve requirements flexibly within the maintenance period. Banks can thus 
make use of this flexibility according to their liquidity situation. Consequently, a 
minimum reserve system with an averaging provision operates as a buffer for 
liquidity shocks, smoothing fluctuations in the overnight rate. 
  Whenever banks receive central bank credit via open market operations, 
standing facilities or in the form of emergency funding, the central bank requires 
them to provide collateral in security for the credit extended. Likewise, collateral 
is required for intraday credit granted within the payment system. Some central 
banks require the same collateral for open market operations, standing facilities 
and intraday credit. This is the approach adopted by the Eurosystem. But this is 
not always the case. The US central bank, the Federal Reserve (Fed), for example, 
accepts a more limited range of collateral for its open market operations than for 
its standing facilities. 
  The central bank must define those financial institutions that are its 
‘customers ’: in other words, those financial institutions that have direct access to 
central bank financing. The range of counterparties of some central banks may 
vary according to the type of operation. The range of counterparties in the Fed’s 
open market operations, for example, is very limited (about 20 banks), but its 
standing facilities are accessible to a broad set of banks. The Eurosystem has a 
very broad range of counterparties, and in the pre-crisis period it only restricted 
banks’ access to fine-tuning operations. 
  The discussion above has provided an overview of the standard central bank 
model for liquidity steering that is currently applied in a variety of forms.
3 During 
the crisis that began in August 2007, however, central banks have applied and 
remoulded this model in a variety of ways. The standard model allows reshaping 
in respect of many of its features: in respect of open market operations, standing 
facilities, the minimum reserve system, the range of counterparties and collateral 
policy. 
  During the crisis, it has been necessary for central banks to consider new 
means of influencing the state of the financial markets in an environment in which 
the policy rate is zero or close to it. Many central banks have, in fact, in one way 
or another abandoned the standard model described above, which seeks to use 
liquidity operations to influence the operational target, and thereby the final 
target. In addition to the traditional operational target, many central banks have 
also begun to strive for other objectives: they have sought to influence much 
longer-term interest rates than the overnight rate, thereby influencing the yield 
curve; they have sought to influence various risk premia in the financial markets; 
                                                 
3 The standard model is often referred to as a corridor model. This is because the interest rates on 
the marginal lending and deposit facilities provide a corridor, ie a ceiling and a floor, for short-
term (normally overnight) interest rates.  
10 
they have sought to influence not only prices (interest rates), but also access to 
finance; they have sought to influence the functioning of the financial markets 
(improve market liquidity, reduce market uncertainty). 
  The pursuit of these objectives has necessitated the introduction of new 
instruments and procedures, with central banks implementing non-standard 
operations during the crisis, referred to officially as non-standard monetary policy 
operations or unconventional monetary policy operations. No unambiguous 
definitions exist for these concepts, and some may use them to mean the same 
thing. The measures can possibly be classified into two categories: some can be 
interpreted as variations of the previously applied operational framework, while 
others are clearly exceptional compared with the normal operational framework. 
  Outright asset purchases in the financial markets, with the aim of influencing 
other than the operational target of monetary policy, are currently considered as 
being non-standard operations.
4 In conducting these purchases, central banks 
acquire securities for their portfolios directly from the financial markets. The 
assets may be debt securities issued by either the public or the private sector. In 
buying public sector debt securities in the markets, the central bank seeks to 
influence the yield curve. In buying private sector debt securities, the central bank 
seeks to influence interest rate spreads (risk premia). Both measures also impact 
on the availability of financing. 
  Outright asset purchases usually cause the balance sheets of central banks to 
grow. Accordingly, the volume of central bank liquidity in the economy tends to 
expand. The composition of central bank balance sheets also changes as a 
consequence of these operations. 
  As Borio and Disyatat (2009) point out, operations that influence the size and 
composition of central bank balance sheets are not new or exceptional in the sense 
that they have not been conducted before; they have, and in large amounts. 
Central bank interventions in foreign exchange markets, for example, belong to 
this category. In performing foreign exchange interventions, central banks seek to 
influence the exchange rate (ie the price of the currency), and the operations have 
an impact on the size and composition of central bank balance sheets. What is 
new or exceptional in the balance sheet operations presently being conducted is 
that they have been carried out in market segments in which central banks do not 
normally operate and with motives that deviate from normal. 
 
 
                                                 
4 These operations have also been conducted before: see eg Bindseil (2004) and Kuttner (2006). 
Kuttner also endeavours to assess the impact of outright asset purchases on the yield curve.  
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3  Liquidity measures implemented by central 
banks during the crisis 
This section reviews the actions during the crisis of the central banks of the eight 
countries (economic areas) mentioned above. Previous comparative studies have 
mainly been conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ECB.  
 
 
3.1 Comments  on  the literature 
The Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), acting in connection 
with the BIS, published a report on the subject as early as August 2008. This deals 
with the actions of seven central banks (excluding Sweden) during the crisis. 
However, a lot has happened since publication of the report, which only covers 
the early stages of the crisis. The CGFS’ work has been carried on within the BIS 
by Borio and Nelson (2008) and Borio and Disyatat (2009), who have focused on 
analysing non-standard operations. 
  The IMF has published three reports on the theme: Chailloux et al (2008), 
Stella (2009) and Klyuev et al (2009). The analysis by Chailloux et al (2008) 
roughly includes the same range of central banks as the BIS reports. Klyuev et al 
(2009) study the unconventional measures taken by the central banks of seven 
countries (excluding Sweden) and their implications. The analysis by Stella 
(2009) concentrates on Fed balance sheets issued since 1951. 
  Papadia and Välimäki (2010) provide an extremely thorough analysis of 
Eurosystem activities since 1999. Furthermore, they examine the actions of the 
central banks of the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom, including 
balance sheet developments. Cheun et al (2009) analyse the collateral frameworks 
of the Eurosystem, the Fed and the Bank of England. The ECB’s Monthly 
Bulletin (ECB, 2009) largely includes material similar to that in the analysis by 
Papadia and Välimäki (2010) on central bank balance sheets.  
  A new feature in this crisis has been the establishment of swap lines between 
central banks, particularly to provide US dollar liquidity to banks operating 
outside the United States. Goldberg et al (2010) present an analysis of dollar-
related swap arrangements and their impacts. Moessner and Allen (2010) provide 





3.2  Observations on liquidity operations carried out by 
central banks 
Central bank interest rate policies (Figure 1) and liquidity policies during the 
crisis have been affected by several factors: the scale of change in the economic 
situation (the scale of the macroeconomic and financial shock), central bank 
mandates (differences in final targets, differences in the opportunities to use 
various monetary policy instruments), financial market structure (bank dominance 
vs financial intermediation via securities markets) and the status quo ante (the 
type of instruments and procedures in place prior to the crisis). Consequently, the 
situation of the countries dealt with here and their central banks is highly 
heterogeneous in respect of these features.
5 Nevertheless, the actions of the central 
banks during the crisis have not highlighted differences or heterogeneity; instead, 
the liquidity operations of the central banks have become similar. Although 
central bank actions have displayed some significant differences, they still bear 
witness to some sort of convergence rather than divergence. 
 
Observations related to open market operations: 
 
–  The central banks of all countries have extended the maturity of their open 
market operations, some up to 12 months (Australia, the euro area, Canada, 
Sweden and Switzerland). Before the crisis, the Eurosystem covered about a 
third of the liquidity provision in open market operations by operations 
executed monthly with a maturity of three months. During the crisis, the 
Eurosystem introduced one-month (covering a maintenance period), six-
month and even 12-month open market operations. The Eurosystem has been 
a pioneer in this area. 
 
–  All central banks have used fine-tuning operations more actively than before. 
These are normally aimed at reducing fluctuations in overnight rates. 
 
–  Some central banks (Eurosystem and Fed) have altered their tender 
procedures, migrating from variable-rate tenders to fixed-rate tenders (with 
full allotment). In the case of fixed- rate tenders with full allotment the 
counterparties determine the allotment amounts, with collateral serving as the 
only constraint. Liquidity is thus determined by demand – not by supply. 
 
–  Some central banks (Eurosystem and Swiss National Bank) have frontloaded 
the liquidity provision within the maintenance period. 
                                                 
5 For the pre-crisis operational frameworks of the central banks dealt with here, see eg Borio and 
Nelson (2008) and Chailloux et al (2008).  
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 Changes  to  standing facilities and minimum reserve systems have been 
relatively small. The central banks of the euro area, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland and the United States have narrowed the width of the corridor formed 
by the interest rates on the standing facilities. The Reserve Bank of Australia 
introduced a new window facility for longer-term deposits. The Bank of Japan 
launched a deposit facility. The Fed extended the maturity of discount credit. The 
Bank of England discontinued the publication of the names of counterparties to its 
standing facilities and gave banks more leeway for the fulfilment of minimum 
reserve requirements. 
  All the central banks have expanded the lists of assets accepted as collateral; 
collateral policy has thus been eased. The Eurosystem has also moved in the 
opposite direction and tightened the use as collateral of certain types of asset-
backed securities (ABSs). This was done in response to the losses suffered by the 
Eurosystem in connection with the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers and the 
Icelandic banks. 
  All the central banks, excluding the Reserve Bank of Australia, have 
broadened the range of counterparties or admitted existing counterparties broader 
access to various forms of central bank credit. Given that the Eurosystem has had 
a very broad range of counterparties from the beginning, there has been no 
significant pressure on the Eurosystem in this respect. However, the Eurosystem 
has enlarged the range of counterparties to its fine-tuning operations and assigned 
eligible counterparty status to the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
  All the central banks other than those of Canada and Sweden have started 
purchasing securities outright in the financial markets for their balance sheets. 
The most active player has been the Fed, with purchases of very different types of 
securities (debt issued by the federal government, debt securities issued by GSE 
institutions, MBSs). The Bank of England has bought both sovereign debt and 
private sector debt securities. In July 2009, the Eurosystem launched a 
programme, implemented via the ECB and the national central banks, targeting 
purchase of covered bank bonds for a total of around EUR 60 billion. In May 
2010, the ECB announced its intention to start buying public debt securities. 
  The central banks of the euro area, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and 
the United States have introduced or expanded their securities lending 
programmes. These programmes do not affect the amount of central bank 
liquidity in the economy, but improve the liquidity and functioning of the markets 
concerned. 
  Central banks have opened swap lines, by means of which US dollar liquidity, 
in particular, has been provided outside the dollar region. The Fed has established 
such swap arrangements with 14 central banks, including the seven other central 
banks mentioned here and the central banks of Denmark and Norway. The ECB, 
the Swiss National Bank and Sveriges Riksbank have also been active in this area. 
  
14 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to these measures, the Bank of Japan has purchased shares to support 
the stock market, the Swiss National Bank has bought foreign currencies in order 
to prevent excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc and issued central bank 
certificates of deposit with the aim of absorbing money market liquidity, the 
Eurosystem has absorbed liquidity by collecting deposits via tenders and the Fed 
has made direct loans to some institutions. 
 
 
3.3  Central bank balance sheets 
As a consequence of the operations carried out, central bank balance sheets have 
grown very strongly in all the countries other than Japan. (Figure 2 shows each 
country’s balance sheet in terms of its own currency; Figure 3 plots the balance 
sheets relative to nominal GDP.) The balance sheet of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, too, does not suggest any trend growth, even though it expanded 
vigorously at the end of 2008 following the panic caused by the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. The strongest balance sheet growth was witnessed in Sweden, 
at about 250%. The United Kingdom, Switzerland and the United States 
experienced balance sheet growth of some 150%. The balance sheet of the 
Eurosystem roughly doubled. The balance sheet of the Bank of Canada grew by 
around 30–40%. 
  The evolution of the balance sheets and their size relative to nominal GDP are 
also interesting. Before the crisis, the size of the balance sheet relative to nominal 
GDP was the smallest in Canada (at around 3.5%). In the United Kingdom, 
Sweden and the United States, the balance sheet equalled around 6–7% of GDP. 
Japan (around 25%) and Switzerland (around 20%) had much larger balance 
sheets. The Eurosystem (around 15%) was somewhere in the middle. 
  Following the crisis, balance sheet size relative to GDP grew very strongly in 
Switzerland (to about 40%) and the euro area (to about 30%), reaching the 
Japanese level. The balance sheet of Sveriges Riksbank also expanded to the same 
level. The United Kingdom and the United States saw the ratio rise to some 15%. 
  The central bank balance sheets have been boosted by both outright asset 
purchases (especially in the United States and the United Kingdom) and fixed-rate 
full allotment tender procedures in open market operations (notably within the 
Eurosystem). Foreign currency operations conducted by central banks have been 
particularly large in Sweden and Switzerland. Sveriges Riksbank has provided US 
dollar liquidity to its counterparties and established swap lines with Iceland, 
Lithuania and Estonia. The Swiss National Bank has bought foreign exchange in 
the markets and provided foreign currency liquidity to its counterparties. 
  On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, banknote issuing has developed 
very steadily. The expansion of the balance sheets has meant strong growth in the 
monetary base.  
17 
Figure 2.  Central bank balance sheets in national currencies 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.  Central bank balance sheets (December) relative 








































































































  The balance sheet developments reflect the scale of shocks hitting the 
economies and the role of the financial markets in various countries. The raw 
material producers Australia and Canada have coped with the crisis fairly well. 
The Canadian banking and financial sector managed to avoid financial market 
problems considerably better than its southern neighbour. Canadian, Australian 
and Japanese financial institutions were less exposed to complex structured  
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financial instruments than their US and European counterparts. The evolution of 
the balance sheet of Sveriges Riksbank has been affected by concerns and doubts 
over Swedish banks’ risks in the Baltic States. The United Kingdom, Swiss and 
US financial systems have been under particularly severe pressure. Japan’s pre-
crisis leeway was already very limited. 
 
 
4  Thoughts on the experiences gained; open 
questions 
As the economic crisis has not yet come to an end and economies are only now at 
the recovery phase, with many central banks still at least partly in crisis mode, it is 
too early to draw strong conclusions from central banks’ interest rate policies and 
liquidity operations during the crisis. The same naturally applies to other segments 
of economic policy. Even so, it is useful for both monetary policymakers and 
researchers to start considering the lessons and conclusions to be drawn from the 
experiences gained. This section raises some themes that particularly concern 
central bank liquidity operations. At this stage, there are probably more open 
questions than informative answers. 
 
 
4.1 Exit  from  measures 
With the economic situation improving and the financial markets returning to 
normal, central banks need to consider how they will exit from their relaxed 
interest rate policies, non-standard measures in liquidity operations and various 
other actions to stimulate the financial markets. Some central banks have already 
raised their policy rates and partly phased out their liquidity operations introduced 
during the crisis. Meanwhile, others have chosen to introduce new operations and 
approaches or, for example, continue outright asset purchases. 
  Clearly, there is no straightforward answer or recommendation on how to exit. 
An optimal exit will depend on many factors, such as the macroeconomic 
situation, economic policy measures other than monetary policy actions and the 
state of the financial markets. Some of the measures and procedures introduced in 
the area of liquidity management can be such that they need to be used over a 
longer period of time and perhaps even on a permanent basis (Section 4.4). 
Exiting from securities portfolios accumulated during the crisis will last many 




4.2  Assessing the success of measures taken 
The success of measures taken in monetary policy and other economic policies 
ought to be assessed. This is no easy task. In the first place, it is both difficult and, 
actually, impossible to identify the significance of various measures. What has 
been the role of interest rate policy? What has been the impact of liquidity 
operations? What has been the impact of financial market stimulus measures 
launched by central banks and other policymakers? What has been the role of 
other economic policies (such as fiscal policy)? Measures already begin to 
influence economic behaviour as soon as some information on them becomes 
available. 
  Secondly, it is not very easy to determine where the actual focus should be 
when we want to assess the effectiveness of central bank measures. The ultimate 
aim of the measures is to support economic recovery, and their impact on, for 
example, economic activity (growth, labour or the housing market) should be 
evaluated in that light. Liquidity operations are carried out with a view to 
influencing, in the first place, the state and functioning of the financial markets, 
and particularly the money markets. Then, indicators such as the evolution of the 
operational target and its deviation from the policy rate, the trend in periodic 
interest rates, the yield curve, various r i s k  p r e m i a  ( s p r e a ds) could serve as 
yardsticks. Interposing between these two groups of variables is the measurement 
of the general sentiment and state of the financial markets, for example, by means 
of a monetary index (a combination of market interest rates and foreign exchange 
rates), a financial market index (a combination of various market interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates and stock prices) or credit developments. 
  In all the countries examined here, money market interest rates have closely 
followed the path of the central bank’s policy rate. The link is usually closer, the 
shorter the maturity under review. Long-term interest rates (such as 5-year or 10-
year government bond yields) have also fallen, but less than money market rates. 
Yield curves have steepened considerably. Japan, where the pre-crisis leeway for 
interest rate policy was already very limited, emerges as an exception. 
 
 
4.3  Operational target of monetary policy and assessment 
of the policy stance 
As noted in Section 2, the most common operational target of monetary policy 
among the countries under review is the overnight interest rate. Exceptions are the 
Swiss National Bank, whose operational target is the three-month unsecured 
market interest rate, and the ECB, whose operational target is unclear.  
27 
  Prior to the crisis, and for a while during it, the euro area overnight interest 
rate, the EONIA, was on average at the same level as the ECB’s key policy rate 
(the minimum bid rate in the main refinancing operation, MRO) (Figure 4). Since 
the Eurosystem’s introduction of fixed-rate full allotment tender procedures, the 
EONIA has been clearly below the key policy rate. The same is true for other 
short-term money market rates. The EONIA has actually been constrained by the 
Eurosystem rate on the deposit facility, and against this background the rate on the 
deposit facility has in practice become a key, or at least a very important, policy 
rate. 
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The Eurosystem’s practice is somewhat puzzling. If the stance of monetary policy 
is assessed on the basis of the MRO rate, a picture other than that painted by the 
EONIA and short-term money market interest rates emerges.
6 At the same time, it 
                                                 
6 Bindseil (2004, 1) notes immediately at the beginning of his book that monetary policy 
implementation means the selection of an operational target and how the central bank seeks to 
achieve the operational target using various monetary policy instruments. This is the driving idea 
of the book. The publications by the BIS (2008) and Borio and Nelson (2008) also underline that 
the operational target should be close to the key policy rate and that the success of monetary policy 
implementation should even be assessed on this basis.  
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may be perfectly possible and even useful for a central bank to adopt different 
approaches during normal times and under strained market conditions. 
  There is no unequivocal definition of an operational target. As a rule, central 
banks choose the overnight rate as the operational target because it is easiest for 
them to influence the shortest possible interest rates. The central bank usually has 
the best grip on precisely the overnight rate. The overnight rate is also important 
for the functioning of wholesale market funding. But, from the perspective of 
monetary policy formulation for macroeconomic purposes, there would be a case 
for choosing a longer money market interest rate than the overnight rate, such as 
one-month or three-month rates, as an operational target, like currently in 
Switzerland, or in Finland in the 1990s.
7 
  Assessment of the monetary policy stance becomes difficult if the central 
bank starts to make outright purchases and influence the yield curve (long-term 
interest rates) and various risk premia.
8 Then, the stance of monetary policy is not 
only represented by, for example, the overnight rate or the key policy rate, but 
also by long-term interest rates. How can the stance of monetary policy be 
assessed in such a situation? 
 
 
4.4  Which procedures are permanent? What should be 
changed? 
It is possible that some of the procedures and instruments adopted by central 
banks during the crisis will be perceived as useful in the future, too. Some may be 
useful upon return to normal; others may be found useful in forthcoming crises 
and shocks. 
  There is a common understanding that open market operations with long 
maturities have made highly useful contributions during the crisis. This view is 
supported by their strong popularity in Eurosystem operations, in particular. 
Longer-term operations will probably be of great use in future crises, too. 
Meanwhile, upon return to normal, the role of longer-term operations is likely to 
become closer to what it was prior to the crisis. It may well be that there is no 
exact return to the precise status quo prior to the crisis.
9 From the historical point 
of view, it is interesting that Eurosystem longer-term operations were included in 
the Eurosystem toolbox largely by accident, as a result of a compromise, and 
                                                 
7 Bindseil (2004, Chapter 3.1) argues that, for the formation of interest rate expectations, the 
overnight interest rate is a more logical operational target than any periodic rate. 
8 Borio and Disyatat (2009) raise this question. 
9 The need for longer-term operations also essentially depends on the size of the liquidity deficit. If 
it is small, there is less need for various types of open market operations. The size of the liquidity 
deficit naturally has a crucial impact on the amount of collateral required, too, and possibly on the 
type of collateral. The smaller the liquidity deficit, the lower the amount of collateral required.  
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many have regarded them as completely futile. Opinions have surely changed in 
this respect. 
  Fixed-rate tenders have also functioned well during the crisis, at least as 
regards banks’ access to liquidity. Counterparties have known exactly the price at 
which they have been able to cover their needs for central bank liquidity. The full 
allotment tender procedure is, however, challenging for the central bank’s balance 
sheet management, as under this procedure the balance sheet (its size and 
composition) starts to be determined by the actions of banks, and the central 
bank’s own grip on its balance sheet loosens. The same applies to determination 
of the overnight interest rate. 
 Central  banks’  collateral policies have converged during the crisis. It remains 
to be seen to what extent the changes will be permanent and to what extent we 
will see a return to the pre-crisis situation. Since the failures of Lehman Brothers 
and the Icelandic banks, the Eurosystem has paid attention to the use of ABS-type 
collateral assets whose collateral values collapse in the case of a counterparty 
encountering difficulties. Efforts have been made to root out practices of this kind. 
Bank certificates of deposit include similar features. 
  Some central banks’ collateral requirements vary depending on the operations 
involved: central banks may require different collateral for open market 
operations (with differences occurring according to the type of the operation), 
marginal lending facilities and intraday credit. There is a justification for 
permitting different solutions. The differentiation of collateral assets by 
instrument requires an appropriate collateral framework. In the much-used 
pooling system, for example, differentiation is difficult, if not actually impossible. 
  During the crisis, central banks have slightly expanded the range of their 
counterparties. Particularly under difficult economic conditions, direct access to 
central bank financing and instruments has been deemed important. A highly 
liberal counterparty policy may thus be warranted in times of crisis (Madigan, 
2010). But the reverse of this is that such a policy in some degree erodes market 
activity, as financial intermediation shifts away from the markets and onto central 
bank balance sheets. Of course, there may be a justification for allowing different 
counterparties to participate in different liquidity operations. 
  One question worth posing is whether a central bank should accept at all as 
eligible counterparties financial institutions whose operations and supervision 
mainly take place outside their own country or economic area. Lehman Brothers 
and the Icelandic banks were such counterparties. From the point of view of the 
central bank’s own risk management, a successful collateral policy undoubtedly 
provides final security and is perhaps more important than the counterparty issue. 
  Another perspective from which the counterparty issue could be viewed is to 
consider which financial institutions are important for monetary policy 
transmission and which are important for financial market stability or overall 
activity. The Eurosystem counterparty policy, for example, is based on institutions  
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that are key to monetary policy transmission: credit institutions. Counterparties 
important for financial market stability or overall activity could also include other 
non-bank financial firms, depending on the structure of the financial markets 
(Kohn, 2010). 
  Outright asset purchases in the financial markets as a monetary policy 
instrument clearly belong to non-standard measures, not to normal activity. 
Central banks’ own-currency-denominated investment portfolios represent a grey 
area. Central banks do not usually report on qualitative changes that have 
occurred inside these portfolios. Such measures may nevertheless have an impact 
on the condition and functioning of the financial markets. 
 Central  banks’  securities lending programmes underpin the functioning of the 
financial markets, especially market liquidity. Central banks engage in this type of 
activity during normal times by making use of their investment portfolios. When, 
in extraordinary circumstances, they acquire portfolios for monetary policy 
purposes, securities in such portfolios can also be lent out. 
  Swap lines established between central banks have served to meet foreign 
currency needs and thereby reduce ensuing problems and tensions. One 
alternative to accommodating banks’ foreign currency liquidity needs might have 
been the sale of central bank holdings of securities denominated in foreign 
currency. This could have been difficult in a sensitive market situation, possibly 
resulting in further disruptions to securities markets. Consequently, swap lines can 
be seen as a kind of substitute for the use of foreign reserve assets. If swap lines 
were to remain permanent or central banks could rely on them being opened in 
similar future situations, they would reduce the need to hold foreign reserves. 
Aizenman et al (2010) and Obstfeld et al (2009) argue that foreign reserves and 
swap lines can also be complementary: swap lines are opened only with those 
central banks that hold sufficient foreign reserves. This acts as an incentive to 
accumulate large foreign reserves. 
 
 
4.5  Central bank risks 
As a consequence of the liquidity operations, central banks’ risks have increased 
quite significantly in many cases. This follows both from growth in the size of 
central bank balance sheets and from changes in the composition of the asset side 
of the balance sheet, longer maturities in open market operations, more relaxed 
collateral policies and a wider range of counterparties. Credit extended via open 
market operations and standing facilities, and emergency liquidity assistance 
(ELA), if any, are associated with a risk related to the counterparty and a risk 
related to collateral. Outright asset purchases include both market risk and credit 
risk. If a central bank has bought foreign currency during the crisis and increased  
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its foreign reserve base (as the Swiss National Bank has), the foreign exchange 
risk of the central bank has grown. 
 
 
4.6 Central  banks’  role,  independence and governance 
structures 
Taylor (2009) presents a highly critical assessment of the Fed’s actions during the 
crisis. His critique focuses particularly on the very strong expansion of the Fed’s 
balance sheet, the underlying ‘money printing’, outright purchases of assets that 
are kept on the Fed’s balance sheet and direct lending to certain economic sectors 
and institutions (AIG, Bear Stearns). Taylor finds the Fed’s actions highly 
questionable and considers it necessary for the Fed to return to the pre-crisis 
situation as soon as possible. In his view, the Fed has strongly deviated from 
normal monetary policy procedures under which the central bank steers the 
overnight rate via its liquidity operations while not otherwise interfering much in 
the functioning of the financial markets. Taylor considers the Fed’s actions as 
being a combination of traditional monetary policy and industrial policy. In fact, 
he refers to the Fed’s activities as ‘mondustrial policy’ (industrial policy using 
monetary policy tools). 
  In Taylor’s opinion, the Fed’s actions pose numerous problems. In the first 
place, the amount of central bank money (monetary base) in the economy has 
grown vigorously, a fact that must always be taken into account. Secondly, the 
central bank’s risks have hugely increased and may pose a threat to its financial 
position, independence and room for manoeuvre in monetary policy going 
forward. Thirdly, industrial policy in the United States and generally in other 
countries as well belongs to institutions other than the central bank. Currently, the 
Fed takes both monetary policy and industrial policy decisions. This is a highly 
peculiar constellation and cannot be regarded as sustainable. Industrial policy 
decisions should be taken elsewhere than the Fed, mainly in the US Congress. 
  The points put forward by Taylor are also relevant for all other central banks 
with strongly swollen balance sheets and significantly increased risks. On the 
other hand, central banks in some countries may act as government agents, as the 
governments do not necessarily have other channels to promptly address the 
condition of the financial markets. This may be interpreted as meaning that in 
such a case the government (implicitly) safeguards the central bank’s capital 





This paper has reviewed the liquidity operations conducted by the central banks of 
eight countries during the financial market and economic crisis that began in 
August 2007. Despite different starting positions and economic developments, the 
central banks’ actions during the crisis have not been marked by divergence or 
heterogeneity: on the contrary, their liquidity operations have converged. Close 
cooperation and smooth exchange of information and experience between the 
central banks are one factor behind these developments. In the context of open 
market operations, central banks have used more fine-tuning operations, 
lengthened the maturities of operations and experimented with fixed-rate full 
allotment tender procedures. They have narrowed the width of the corridor formed 
by the interest rates on the standing facilities. Collateral policy has been eased, 
and counterparty policy has become more liberal. Central banks have bought 
securities for outright holding on their balance sheets. They have introduced new 
securities lending programmes and provided liquidity across borders. 
  In many cases, central bank balance sheets have undergone extremely strong 
growth. Of the central banks reviewed here, this is particularly true for the central 
banks of the euro area, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
States. Moreover, there has been a considerable change in the composition of 
balance sheets. These five central banks in particular have seen their risks increase 
sharply. With balance sheets ballooning, the monetary base has experienced 
strong growth. 
  The actions by central banks during the crisis raise a number of questions 
concerning exit from the measures taken, the impact of the measures, central 
banks’ risks and independence and their governance structures. In the worst case, 
the strongly increased risks of central banks may act as a constraint on the room 
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